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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-MINNESOTA

DEPARTMENT

OF

HEALTH RELEASE OF NAMES OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ABORTION
PROVIDERS HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF A PATIENT'S RIGHT OF

PRIVACy-Minnesota Medical Association v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84
(Minn. 1978).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 1977, a newspaper reporter from the Catholic Bulletin
requested the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare to provide
him with a list of all physicians, clinics, and hospitals that had per
formed abortions for Medicaid 1 patients in 1975 and 1976. In addi
tion, he wanted to know the amount of the state's subsidy for these
services. The information sought by the journalist was stored on
computer tapes retained by the Department of Welfare. The de
partment agreed to provide the information if the Catholic Bulletin
would prepare the computer program for retrieving the data. 2
The Minnesota Medical Association and its president objected
to any disclosure of this information on the grounds that patients'
and doctors' rights to receive and render medical treatment might
be jeopardized. They sought a temporary and permanent injunc
tion in the Ramsey County District Court to prohibit the dissemi
nation of the information until regulations governing access to
computer-stored information were adopted. On November 23,
1977, the court issued a temporary restraining order and an order
to show cause. Following the hearing on December 14, 1977, the
court denied the motion for a temporary injunction. Justice E.
Thomas Brennan held that the information was public, and that
prohibiting disclosure would impose an unconstitutional prior re
straint on publication by the Catholic Bulletin. 3
The plaintiffs appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, con
1. "Medicaid" is used interchangeably here with state medical assistance pro
grams. The Medicaid Program, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396-1396i (1976), was developed for the purpose of "making payments to States
which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, State plans for medical assistance." Id. § 1396. The Minnesota Medical As
sistance Program was established to comply with and give effect to title XIX. "The
various terms and provisions hereof, including the amount of medical assistance paid
hereunder, are intended to comply with and give effect to the program set out in Ti
tle XIX of the federal Social Security Act." MINN. STAT. § 256B.22 (1971).
2. 274 N.w.2d 84, 86 (Minn. 1978).

3.

Id.
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tending that state agencies must adopt rules governing access to
computer files before releasing any information stored therein. Dis
closure, they argued, would infringe upon Medicaid patients' pri
vacy rights and statutory rights to a free choice of physician. It
would also impair physicians' privacy rights and rights to adminis
ter medical treatment according to their professional judgment. Al
though petitioners raised their constitutional arguments in terms of
both the doctors' and patients' rights, the primary concern was
with the welfare of needy women who seek state funded abor
tions. 4
In Minnesota Medical Association v. State,5 the Minnesota Su
preme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the injunction.
Chief Justice Robert J. Sheran, writing for the majority, held that
information concerning payments to medical assistance providers
was open to public scrutiny.6 Moreover, the court held that no
rules governing access to computer files were necessary in this case
because the procedure concerned only the internal management of
the agency, and thus, it fell within the exception 'to the statutory
rulemaking requirement. 7 The court found insufficient evidence to
establish that disclosure would unconstitutionally infringe upon the
privacy rights of the patients or the rights of the doctors to admin~
[d. at 87.
S. [d.
6. [d. at 89. The court argued that under the Minnesota Data Privacy Act the
information could not be considered "private" or "confidential" because there was
no statute or federal law classifying the information as "not public." [d. at 88 (citing
MINN. STAT. § IS.162(2)(a), (S)(a) (1977)). Therefore, the court concluded that the in
formation must be "public data," which means data that is accessible to the public.
[d. (citing MINN. STAT. § IS.162(S)(a) (1977)).
Appellants argued that the information was, nonetheless, not "public data" be
cause the computer tapes on which it was stored did not come within the definition
of "public records." [d. (citing MINN. STAT. § IS.17(1) (1977)). The statute provides
that public records shall be made on durable paper, but that they may be photo
graphed, photostated, microphotographed, or microfilmed, and that reproductions
may be substituted for the originals. MINN. STAT. § 15.17(1) (1977). No provisions
are made for computer tapes. The court held, however, that whether records are pub
lic depends not on the form in which they are kept, but on whether they are "neces
sary to a full and accurate knowledge" of official activities. 274 N.W.2d at 88 (citing
MINN. STAT. § IS.17(1) (1977)). All such records must be easily accessible for con
venient use upon demand of any person. MINN. STAT. § IS.17(4) (1977).
7. 274 N.W.2d at 90. The statute requires the commissioner to promulgate
rules, in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, to implement the en
forcement and administration of the Data Privacy Act. MINN. STAT. § IS.1671 (1977).
The Administrative Procedures Act, however, in its definition of rules, excludes
"rules concerning only the internal management of the agency or other agencies, and
which do not directly affect the rights of or procedure available to the public." [d. §
IS.0411 (1977).
4.
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ister medical treatment according to their professional judgments.
Chief Justice Sheran also determined that official records of med
ical assistance payments are not so personal as to come within the
doctors' constitutional right of privacy. 8
In Minnesota Medical, the Minnesota Supreme Court was
faced with balancing a woman's right of privacy surrounding the
abortion decision against the public's right to obtain information
about government spending for abortions. The court reached its
decision in favor of disclosure by distinguishing between direct and
indirect interferences with a woman's privacy rights. The Minne
sota court recognized that courts are compelled to protect a wom
an's privacy rights when the state interferes with the abortion deci
sion. 9 It determined, however, that these same rights wHl not be
protected when the state interferes with them in an indirect man
ner, notwithstanding the equally burdensome effects on the abor
tion decision. This case, therefore,. seriously undermines the pri
vacy right established in previous abortion cases. Consequently,
this note addresses the nature of the woman's right of privacy and
the extent to which the state may intrude in matters affecting her
exercise of that right.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A woman has the right of privacy in matters of contraception
and procreation to make certain important decisions free from in
terference by the state. 10 Although these rights are not articulated
in the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held in
Griswold v. Connecticut l l that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaran
tees that help give them life and substance. "12 Included in these
8.

274 N.W.2d at 93-94.
9. Id. at 92 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976)).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
11. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
12. There is no definitive statement on the source of the right of privacy. In
Griswold, the Court stated that the right of privacy is found in the penumbras of the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 484.
Justice Goldberg concurred in the Griswold decision, but found the right of privacy
to exist in the ninth amendment. In his opinion, the ninth amendment was included
to indicate that the first eight amendments were not an exhaustive list of the individ
ual rights reserved to the citizens. Id. at 488. The approaches taken by previous
courts in identifying the sources of the right of privacy were not rejected by the
Court in Roe v. Wade. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, however, ex
pressed his preference for the view that the privacy right was founded in the four
teenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action. This
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penumbras are the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage re
lationship and the attendant right of the married couple to use con
traceptives free from governmental intrusion. 13 In 1972, the Court
found in Eisenstadt v. Baird 14 that the right of privacy means "the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child. "15
In 1973, the Court decided Roe v. Wade 16 in which it held
that the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty en
compassed the woman's privacy right to decide whether to termi
nate her pregnancy.17 The Court held unconstitutional part of the
Texas Penal Code that made it a crime to procure an abortion ex
cept when necessary for the purpose of saving the mother's life. 18
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that a
woman's decision whether to have an abortion is protected from in
terference by the state except in cases in which the state has a
compelling interest in safeguarding maternal health, maintaining
medical standards, or protecting potential life. 19 The Court estab
lished that these state interests became more substantial as the
woman approached term, and at some point during pregnancy
these interests became compelling. 20
right includes elements of personal autonomy, and is broad enough to encompass the
woman's decision to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
13. 381 V.S. at 485-86.
14. 405 V.S. 438 (1972).
15. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). For an examination of the two competing
grounds of the privacy right as articulated in Griswold and Eisenstadt, see, Eich
baum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the
Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 361 (1979) (the privacy
right is grounded in notions of individual autonomy rather than in the conventional
interests of marriage and the family).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Id. at 153. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "Deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
18. The Texas criminal abortion legislation that was struck down by the Court
made it a crime to procure an abortion or to attempt one, except with respect to an
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life
of the mother. 410 V.S. at 117 n.1.
19. Id. at 154.
20. (a) For the stage prior to approximately tl)e end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judg
ment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
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In the absence of compelling state interests, the authority of
a state to regulate or interefere with abortions is strictly circum
scribed. Thus, in Doe v. Bolton,21 the Court held that procedural
requirements that the abortion be approved by a hospital com
mittee and two other physicians were unduly restrictive of a wom
an's rights and needs in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 22
The Court reasoned that the requirements burdened the woman's
abortion decision without promoting any compelling state interest.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,23 the Court struck down pa
rental and spousal consent requirements that gave third parties an
absolute veto power over the abortion decision. The Court held
that since the state cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy, it cannot delegate authority to any
person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same
period. 24
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related
to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest
in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
ld. at 164-65.
21. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
22. ld. at 198-99. The Court also struck down both the hospital accreditation re
quirement on the basis that it was not rationally related to the state's interest in
preserving the mother's health, and the residence requirement because it violated
the privileges and immunities clause by denying protection to persons who enter
Georgia for medical services there. ld. at 200. See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
23. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
24. ld. at 69, 74. The Court recognized, however, that the constitutional rights
of minors and adults are not identical. The state has broader authority to regulate the
activities of minors, whether it be for the purpose of assuring the minor's welfare, or
to safeguard the family unit and parental authority. The Court, therefore, emphasized
that their decision did not suggest that every minor can give effective consent for an
abortion. The age and maturity of the child must be considered. ld. at 74-75.
Subsequent to Danforth, the Court has had occasion to speak further on the is
sue of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision. In Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S.
Ct. 3035 (1979), a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent before an abor
tion could be performed on an unmarried minor was struck down. The statute pro
vided that the abortion could be authorized by the court for good cause shown,
notwithstanding the absence of parental consent. Parents would, however, be given
notice of the judicial proceedings brought by the minor to circumvent their consent.
ld. at 3039 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1977)).
Justice Powell, writing a plurality decision for the Court, held that a parental
consent requirement was valid if the minor was entitled as an alternative to go di
rectly to the court for authorization without prior parental notification. ld. at 3051.
Should the court determine that the minor is mature enough to make a fully in
formed abortion decision, or that the abortion is in her best interests, then the court
must authorize the abortion. ld. at 3052.
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Early abortion decisions were interpreted by the lower courts
to secure substantial rights for indigent women. 25 Several cases
held that a state's Medicaid program could not deny funding for
nontherapeutic abortions as long as it funded childbirth. 26 Wolfe v .
. Schroering 27 held that a public hospital could not refuse to perform
abortions based on ethical objections. Whatever rights were se
cured for indigent women in these cases, however, were short
lived. In the abortion funding cases of Beal v. Doe,28 Maher v.
Roe,29 and Poelker v. Doe,30 the Supreme Court reversed the
trend appearing in the lower courts and set limits on the right of
privacy articulated in Roe.
In Beal 31 and Maher,32 the Court held that states were nei
ther statutorily nor constitutionally required to fund non thera
peutic abortions under their Medicaid programs. The Court held in
Poelker 33 that a city may choose to provide publicly funded hospi
tal services for childbirth without providing corresponding services
for elective abortions. The Court realized that without state fund
ing many indigents would have difficulty financing non therapeutic
abortions. That difficulty, however, was not deemed unduly bur
densome on the constitutional right to decide to terminate preg
nancy, and therefore, the regulations were not subject to the
compelling state interest test. The Court reasoned that regulations
limiting funding did not place any obstacles in a woman's path to
an abortion that were not already there by virtue of her indigency.
A woman was still free to procure an abortion using private
funds. 34 The Court then determined that the regulations were per
missible because they were rationally related to the state's legiti
mate interest in encouraging childbirth. 35
25. Regulations that treat abortions differently from similar medical procedures
are held unconstitutionally to interfere with a woman's right of privacy. See, e.g.,
Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Cannon, 463 F. Supp. 531 (D.R.1.
1978); Mobile Women's Medical Clinic v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.
Ala. 1977).
26. See, e.g., Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal
dismissed, cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitz
patrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. Pa. 1975).
27. 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
28. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
29. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
30. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
31. Seal v. Doe, id. at 445.
32. Maher v. Roe, id. at 474.
33. Poelker v. Doe, id. at 521.
34. ld. at 474.
35. ld. at 478. But see id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
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In Maher, the Court stated that its decision signaled no re
treat from Roe or the cases applying it. 36 The point stressed by the
Court was merely that Roe did not declare an unqualified right to
an abortion. 37 There are two sides to the abortion privacy right. It
is impermissible for the state to create obstacles that interfere with
the abortion decision; the state, however, is not obligated to take
affirmative action in making abortion services available to the
poor. 3S

III.

COURT'S OPINION

The Minnesota court's analysis of the constitutional rights of
Medicaid patients was primarily a response to the arguments set
forth by the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (M.C.L. U.) as amicus
curiae. 39 The M. C. L. U. argued that disclosure would unconsti
tutionally interfere with the patients' privacy rights on several
grounds. First, the patients' names might be accidentally disclosed,
causing patients to refrain from obtaining necessary abortions for
fear of such disclosure. Patients also might fear that disclosure
would enable others to infer their reasons correctly for seeing a
objected to the majority's conclusion that Roe established a state interest in encour
aging childbirth that runs throughout pregnancy. The state's interest in the potential
life of the fetus was declared in Roe not to begin until approximately the third tri
mester. 410 U.S. at 163.
36. 432 U.S. at 475.
37. ld. at 473.
38. A further setback for indigent women seeking abortions came in 1976 with
the passage of Fiscal Year 1979 Labor-HEW Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-480,
§ 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978) (Hyde Amendment). The Act prohibits the use of federal
funds for abortions unless necessary to save the mother's life or to prevent severe
and long lasting damage to the mother's health. ld. In July, 1979, three cases were
filed with the Supreme Court for determination of whether' the Hyde Amendment vi
olates the equal protection clause by treating medically necessary abortions differ
ently from other medically necessary surgical procedures. The Court is also pre
sented with the question of whether the act substantively amends title XIX so as to
allow a state to withdraw funding under its Medicaid program for medically neces
sary abortions that title XIX would otherwise require it to provide. Zbaraz v. Quem,
596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.w. 3013 (July 13, 1979)
(No. 79-64); Williams v. Zbaraz, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979), juris. postponed
pending hearing on merits, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979) (No. 79-4).
39. The appellants asserted that collection and disclosure of data relating to
abortions is constitutionally suspect, and may be sustained only upon a showing that
it will be held in confidence and that it will not restrict the physician's right to exer
cise his medical judgment or otherwise interfere with a pregnant woman's right to
obtain an abortion prior to viability of the embryo. 274 N.W.2d at 90. The court re
jected this argument as overly broad and as not correctly stating the Supreme Court's
holding in Danforth. ld. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52).
The court added that "[t]he amicus brief of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
provides a better statement of the constitutional issues." 274 N.W.2d at 90.
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named doctor. Finally, because disclosure might convince some
doctors to discontinue performing Medicaid 'abortions, 40 indigent
women might find it more difficult to obtain an abortion under the
state's medical assistance program. 41
The court's dismissal of these arguments was based primarily
on the lack of substantiating evidence. It reasoned that the possi
bility of accidental disclosure of confidential information should not
be sufficient to deprive the public of access to other information of
a public nature,42 and that there was no evidence that the Depart
ment of Welfare's recording procedures were insufficient to protect
patient anonymity. There was also no evidence before the court
that the possibility of accidental disclosure would be a significant
factor in a patient's decision not to seek an abortion. 43
The court found even less reasonable the argument that a
woman might be deterred from seeking an abortion from a named
provider because others might infer her reason for seeing the doc
tor. The court contended that for such an assumption to have
merit, the doctor would have to provide almost no services except
abortions. In that case, the nature of his practice would probably
be known to the public anyway, even without disclosure. 44
The court had more difficulty with the possibility of a radical
reduction in the number of abortion providers. The court deter
mined, however, that the evidence did not support speculations
that such a reduction would result from disclosure. 45 Nevertheless,
40. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text.
41. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 14-15.
42. 274 N.W.2d at 91. The court cited Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977),
which held that the possibility of accidental disclosure is not sufficient to preclude
the state from acquiring confidential information.
43. 274 N.W.2d at 91.
44. Id. at 91-92.
45. Regarding the testimony, the court stated:
Robert C. Randle, director of the Medical assistance division of the state
Medicaid program, states in his deposition that disclosure of physicians'
names "could have some kind of an impact on participation" of medical pro
viders in the medical assistance program. He goes on to state, however, that
his "primary concern was the relationship between the providers and the
program." Nowhere does he forecast a "radical restriction" in the number of
participating providers.
The affidavit of plaintiff Dr. Chester Anderson states that disclosure of
the names of physicians and the nature of the treatments they provided
"would also discourage physicians and other medical providers from pro
viding treatment covered by the Medical Assistance program to patients el
igible for Medical Assistance and discourage physicians and other medical
providers from performing necessary medical procedures which are contro
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in its analysis, the court recognized that disclosure would permit
the public to pressure doctors to cease providing abortion serv
ices. 46 These two seemingly contradictory findings were reconciled
by distinguishing between private action and state action. The
court did not deny that disclosure by a state agency of that agen
cy's records was state action. It found, however, that disclosure,
standing alone, would place no burden on the doctor. It would not
destroy the confidentiality of his relationship with his patients, and
it would not restrict his freedom to exercise his medical judg
ment. 47 The court stated that public pressure aimed at convincing
a doctor to stop performing abortions constituted private, not state,
action and consequently, would be of no constitutional signifi
cance. 48 The court did not consider, however, that without state
disclosure there could be no private action.
The M. C. L. U. next argued that disclosure would deprive a
physician of his right to practice medicine according to his best
judgment, and without undue interference by the state. 49 Two in
terests are involved here. One is the physician's interest in per
sonal autonomy and self-determination as to which medical services
to provide. The other is his interest in earning a livelihood free
from boycotts, pickets, and other threats to his professional oppor
tunities. 5o Chief Justice Sheran rejected this argument stating that
it is unclear whether a physician has his own right to practice med
icine, or whether that right is merely derivative from the privacy
rights of the patient. 51 The court added that even should such a
versial from a nonmedical point of view." He does not allege any significant
reduction in the number of doctors willing to participate in the medical as
sistance program. Neither Randle nor Anderson offers any support for his
speculations.
Id. at 92.

46. ld.
47. ld.
48. ld. at 92-93.
49. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 28.
50. ld. at 28-29.
51. In Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), the court
stated that Roe had "clearly paved the way for physicians to assert their constitu
tional rights to practice medicine, which now includes the right to advise and per
form abortions," but that such claims were inextricably bound up with the privacy
rights of women who seek abortions. ld. at 1344. In Minnesota Medical, however,
the court relied on Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), where the Supreme
Court stated that it had no occasion in that case to decide whether doctors had their
own constitutional right to practice medicine as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit had maintained. Id. at 113.
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right exist, disclosure in and of itself does not constitute interfer
ence by the state. 52
The court rejected the asserted privacy right of the doctors to
keep the details of their professional and business dealings from
being made public. The court reasoned that the constitutional right
of privacy includes only personal rights of a fundamental nature
and that records of services paid for with public funds cannot be
characterized as purely personal or extremely private. 53 Disclosure,
therefore, would not infringe any fundamental rights of the doc
tors, and was, in fact, proper when balanced against the public's
need for information about th~ workings of government. 54
IV.

ANALYSIS

The constitutional right of privacy is a relatively new and rap
idly developing area of law. 55 Although Roe established that the
52.

274 N.W.2d at 93.

53. ld. at 94 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152).
54. 274 N.W.2d at 93-94.
55. The privacy tort was suggested in 1890 by a law review article. Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The right to privacy was
not judicially established as a constitutional right, however, until 1965. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Since that time cases have expanded the concept
of constitutional privacy, but no concise definition of the right has been formulated.
See Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587 (1977); Eichbaum, supra note
15; Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 329 (1979); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977).
As the ability to collect, store, and disseminate large quantities of personal infor
mation has increased with the widespread use of computers, the need for a well de
fined concept of privacy has become more pressing. Judge Gesell's opinion in
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), although dealing with the
dissemination of criminal records, includes a strong warning applicable to all aspects
of the right of privacy:
The increasing complexity of our society and technological advances which
facilitate massive accumulation and ready regurgitation of far-flung data have
presented more problems in this area, certainly problems not contemplated
by the framers of the Constitution. These developments emphasize a press
ing need to preserve and to redefine aspects of the right of privacy to insure
the basic freedoms guaranteed by this democracy.
A heavy burden is placed on all branches of Government to maintain a
proper equilibrium between the acquisition of information and the necessity
to safeguard privacy. Systematic recordation and dissemination of informa
tion about individual citizens is a form of surveillance and control which
may easily inhibit freedom to speak, to work, and to move about in this land.
If information available to Government is misused to publicize past inci
dents in the lives of its citizens the pressures for conformity will be irresist
ible. Initiative and individuality can be suffocated and a resulting dullness
of mind and conduct will become the norm.
328 F. Supp. at 725-26 (footnote omitted).
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right to decide to have an abortion is within the privacy sphere, it
is still unclear what actions amount to an unconstitutional interfer
ence with that right. Minnesota Medical represents a move toward
limiting the protection that will be accorded privacy rights through
its underlying distinction between direct and indirect interferences
with the abortion decision.
The Minnesota court took a very narrow approach in its analy
sis of the effects of disclosure. It looked at who might interfere
with the doctors' practices rather than who made such interference
possible. The court looked at who might be attacked, rather than
who might suffer. The inevitable conclusion reached from this anal
ysis was that the only potentially adverse consequences of disclo
sure would be private harassment of abortion providers, a matter of
no constitutional significance.
This reasoning ignores the causal chain of events initiated by
disclosure. A more realistic analysis would show that the state is
responsible for interfering with Medicaid patients' constitutional
right of privacy by disseminating sensitive information that can be
used by the public to cause a reduction in the number of abortion
providers. Although the interference is a few steps removed from
the state action of disclosure, it is, nonetheless, equally as burden
some on the abortion decision as direct state interferences would
be. To ignore the indirect effects of state action in the privacy
sphere is to undermine the right of privacy before it has had a
chance to develop fully.

A.

Interference

The legitimacy of a state's authority to require recording and
reporting to the health department of certain doctor-patient trans
actions has been firmly established by two United States Supreme
Court cases. In Danforth,56 the Court upheld the validity of a
Missouri statute requiring reports of all abortions. The statute had
been challenged on the basis that it imposed an extra layer and
burden of regulation on the abortion decision and unconstitution
ally applied to all stages of pregnancy. The Court was sympathetic
to the appellants' argument that during the first trimester of preg
nancy the state should not be able to impose any record keeping
requirements that Significantly differ from those imposed with re
spect to other comparable medical or surgical procedures. 57 The
56. 428 U.S. at 52.
57. The Court held that during the first stage of pregnancy the state may
impose no regulations governing the physician's determination that, in his medical

580

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:569

Court was also sympathetic, however, to the state's argument that
record keeping of this kind can be useful to the state's interest
in protecting the health of its female citizens. In balancing the
competing interests, the Court noted the statute's stringent provi
sions safeguarding the confidentiality of the patients' names and
concluded that the statute posed no legally significant impact or
consequence on the abortion decision or on the doctor-patient rela
tion. 58
The constitutionality of reporting requirements in areas of
health care was reaffirmed by the Court in Whalen v. Roe. 59 In
that case, a New York statute requiring the identification of users
and dispensers of schedule II drugs 60 was challenged on the basis
that such records infringed on the patient's interest in nondis
closure of private information. The Court concluded, however, that
the security provisions of the statute evidenced a proper concern
with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy.61 The
Court recognized the possibility that some patients would forego
needed medication because of the fear of accidental disclosure of
their names. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the threat
was not sufficiently grievous to constitute an invasion of the pa
tients' privacy interests. 62
Whalen 63 addresses two kinds of interests that underlie the
constitutional right of privacy. One is the individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the other is the inter
est in making certain fundamental decisions independently.64 The
Minnesota reporting requirements apparently satisfy the demands
set down in Danforth and Whalen regarding the first privacy interjudgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. Id. at 80 (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64).
58. The Court stated that the requirements for confidentiality, with the sole ex
ception for public health officers, and retention of records for a maximum of seven
years kept the statute within constitutional limits. 428 U.S. at 81. The Court cau
tioned, however, that the statute should not be used to unconstitutionally restrict the
abortion decision through the sheer burden of record keeping detail. Id.
59. 429 U.S. 589 (1976).
60. Schedule II drugs include the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs, such
as opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and meth
aqualone. Id. at 593 n.8. The statute required identification of the prescribing physi
cian, the dispensing pharmacy, the drug and dosage and the name, address and age
of the patient. Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3354 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1976-77)).
61. 429 U.S. at 605.
62. Id. at 603-04.
63. Id. at 589.
64. Id. at 599-600.
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est of confidentiality. The state's interest in abortion records for
statistical purposes and for use in furtherance of maternal health is
clearly valid. 65 The records are also necessary in order to enable
the state to pay the physicians and to investigate the propriety of
such payments. 66 Furthermore, no disclosure of the patients'
names is likely since the computer tapes enable the retrieval of
only specified information. 67
It is the other privacy interest articulated by the Whalen
Court, the interest in independence in making fundamental deci
sions, that is most seriously threatened by disclosure of the names
of abortion providers. In Whalen, the patient's decision to use
schedule II drugs would not be impaired because disclosure of the
sensitive records was merely speculative in view of the statute's
limited access provisions. 68 In Minnesota, the patient's abortion
decision is not similarly protected. Disclosure of the names of abor
tion providers constitutes disclosure of sensitive information which
may have an adverse impact on the patients' privacy rights.
65. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 438 U.S. at 80.
66. The Minnesota medical assistance statute provides:
Subdivision 1. In the interests of efficient administration of the medical as
sistance to the needy program and incident to the approval of rates and char
ges therefor, the commissioner of public welfare may require any reports, in
formation, and audits of medical vendors which he deems necessary.
Subd. 3. The commissioner of public welfare, with the written consent of
the recipient, shall be allowed access to all medical records of medical as
sistance recipients solely for the purpose of investigating whether or not: (a)
a vendor of medical care actually provided the medical care for which a
claim for reimbursement was made; or (b) the medical care was medically
necessary.
Subd. 5. Medical records obtained by the commissioner of public welfare
pursuant to this section are private data, as ,defined in section 15.162, subdi
vision Sa.
MINN. STAT. § 256B.27 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
67. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union argued that disclosure of patients'
names was a legitimate fear in view of the "state's willingness to grant access to its
computers to non-employees and to assist in the preparation of programs by which
persons other than state officials may gain access to information in the state's com
puters." Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 15-16. The court
determined, however, that the state's safeguards against such disclosure were ade
quate. 274 N.W.2d at 86 n.1.
68. 429 U.S. at 600. The Court acknowledged that some people had been dis
couraged from using schedule II drugs because of their concern that the information
might be disclosed. On the other hand, the Court was presented with evidence that
prior to the district court's enjoining the enforcement of the statute, 100,000 prescrip
tions for schedule II drugs had been filled each month. The Court concluded, there
fore, that the statute did not deprive the public of access to the drugs. Id. at 602-03.
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Although disclosure of doctors' names, on its face, may not ap
pear to interfere with a woman's right to make an independent
abortion decision, this does not conclusively detennine whether, in
fact, any interference will result. The practical impact of disclosure
on the doctors, and in turn on their patients, cannot be ignored.
Given the intensity of public feelings on the abortion issue and the
abuse experienced by abortion clinics which are openly operated, 69
many doctors may cease providing abortions to Medicaid patients
in order to escape retaliation from the public. Should such a reduc
tion occur, the indigent woman's access to an abortion would be
greatly restricted.
A reduction in the number of doctors willing to perfonn abor
tions is not as speculative as the court maintains. 7o The Medicaid
program is presently encountering difficulties due to the reluctance
of doctors to participate in the program even in the area of routine
medical care.71 If participation also entails exposing oneself to the
rash of public hostilities aimed at abortion providers,72 the likeli
hood that many doctors will refuse to perform abortions under the
medical assistance program is even greater.
The impact of a reduction in Medicaid abortion providers is
that indigent women will find it even more difficult to tenninate
unwanted, and possibly life-endangering, pregnancies. Abortions,
69.
70.
71.

See note 82 infra.

274 N.W.2d at 92.
Butler, The Medicaid Program; Current Statutory Requirements and Judi
cial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7, 14-15 (1974).
[B]urdensome bureaucratic requirements, such as receiving authorization
before performing services, complex billing procedures, slow payment, low
fee schedules, and frequent changes in program services and procedures,
have turned many physicians away from the Medicaid program. Probably
the greatest single problem facing the Medicaid recipient . . . is the inac
cessibility and unavailability of Medicaid providers, particularly physicians.
Id. at 14. See also Law, Reproductive Freedom in Legal Services Practice, 12
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 389, 397 (1978); Note, The Effects of Present Medicaid Deci
sions on a Constitutional Right: Abortions Only for the Rich? 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
687,704 (1978).
72. The most recent attacks on abortion rights, according to the Women's
Rights Clinic of Antioch School of Law, have taken place not in the courts or the leg
islature, but in the abortion clinics themselves. A 1978 study by the Women's Rights
Clinic describes the variety of tactics that have been used to disrupt abortion clinics
in areas as diverse as Anchorage, Omaha, and Cincinnati. Burnings and fire bombings
were reported in eight clinics since May, 1977. Other damage was caused by vandals
and trespassers. Patients have been intimidated in waiting rooms, and picketers have
recorded the license plate numbers of patients and staff members at these clinics. In
Minnesota, two children of clinic board members required protection because of
anonymous personal threats. [1978] 4 ABORTION L. REP. (Women's Rights Clinic,
Antioch School of Law) 20.1 to .2 (Anti-Choice Activity).
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even when paid for by private funds, are often hard to procure. In
1977, nearly 500,000 women had to travel considerable distances,
and often out of state, for abortions. Approximately 600,000 women
who wanted abortions were unable to obtain them at all. 73 One of
the reasons for this inaccessibility is the concentration of abortion
facilities in relatively few urban centers in each state. 74 Another
contributing factor is the relatively small number of public hospi
tals that are willing to perform abortions. 75 In Minnesota, the di
mensions of the problem are illustrated by evidence that outside
the state's major metropolitan areas, abortions were performed by
only five major providers. 76 Any reduction in the number of pro
viders in that area would seriously curtail the availability of abor
tion services.
For indigent women,77 the burden is even more pronounced.
In 1977, women eligible for Medicaid constituted nearly one-fourth
of the women estimated to have been unable to obtain the abor
tions they wanted during the year, even though they represented
less than one-tenth of the women of reproductive age. 78 This pro
portional difference is attributable in part to the indigent woman's
lack of familiarity with the medical system which prevents her from
being able to locate an abortion provider. In addition, she may not
be able to afford to leave her job or her family if the nearest abor
73.

ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, ABORTIONS AND THE POOR: PRIVATE Mo

RALITY, PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

74.

5 (1979).

ld. at 13.

75. Indigents have traditionally relied on public hospitals for medical care. In
1976, however, only 21% of the nation's 2,060 public hospitals performed any abor
tions at all. Id. at 16. Public hospitals attended to 26% of all births, but provided
only 8% of all abortions. Id.
76. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 22-23 n.4.
77. Medicaid patients are by definition poor. Title XIX provides:
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the con
ditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is
hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to
carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
The Minnesota medical assistance statute provides: "Medical assistance for
needy persons whose resources are not adequate to meet the cost of such care is
hereby declared to be a matter of state concern. To provide such care, a statewide
program of medical assistance, with free choice of vendor, is hereby established."
MINN. STAT. § 256B.Ol (1971).
78. See note 73 supra at 13.

584

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vo\. 2:569

tion provider is in a distant city. 79
The Minnesota Medicaid program funds only those abortions
that are necessary to prevent the death of the mother, or those in
which the pregnancy is the result of criminal sexual conduct or in
cest. 80 In the case of medically necessary abortions, the inability to
obtain an abortion may severely threaten the mother's life. Even in
the case of abortions that are not medically necessary, with every
week of delay in finding a doctor who will perform the abortion
there is a twenty percent increase in the risk of complication and a
fifty percent increase in the mortality rate when the abortion is
finally obtained. 81
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that disclosure would
not result in a deprivation of Medicaid patients' rights to privacy in
making an independent abortion decision. 82 "Deprivation," how
ever, is not the test of unconstitutionality set forth in previous
cases. Any state action that unduly interferes with the abortion de
cision, not merely those that totally deprive a woman of her ability
to make an independent abortion decision, are unconstitutional. 83
An inability to find a doctor willing to perform an abortion is just
as burdensome as requiring that the abortion be approved by a .
hospital committee,84 or subject to the confirmation of two other
doctors,85 the spouse,86 or the parent.87 All of these have been
ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court as un
due interferences with the right of privacy in the absence of any
compelling state interest.
79. Id. at 5.
80. The Minnesota medical assistance statute provides:
"Medical assistance" or "medical care" means payment of part or all of the
cost of the following care and services for eligible individuals whose income
and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost:
(13) Abortion services, but only if one of the following conditions is met:
(a) The abortion is a medical necessity ....
(b) The pregnancy is the result of criminal sexual conduct ....
(c) The pregnancy is the result of incest ....
MINN. STAT. § 256B.02(8) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
81. See note 73 supra at 31.
82. 274 N.W.2d at 93.
83. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473 ("a state-created obstacle need not
be absolute to be impermissible ...."); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at
52 (struck down spousal and parental consent requirements that unduly burden the
right to seek an abortion); Doe v. Bolton, '410 U.S. at 179 (struck down procedural re
quirements that unduly restricted or infringed upon the patient's right of privacy).
84. 410 U.s. at 198.
85. ld. at 199.
86. 428 U.s. at 71.
87. ld. at 75. See also note 24 supra.
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The Minnesota court avoided subjecting the issue of disclosure
to the compelling state interest test. It reasoned that the state was
not responsible for any reduction in the number of abortion provid
ers which might interfere with a woman's constitutionally protected
abortion decision. The court held that a doctor's decision to stop
performing abortions would be caused by public hostility rather
than state action, and that therefore, constitutional restraints did
not apply.88 As Justice James C. Otis reminded the court in his
dissent, however, without state action there can be no disclosure,
and without disclosure there will be no private action. 89 The state
cannot deny its role in enabling the public to deny Medicaid pa
tients of their fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court has held that where the state gives the
public the means of denying citizens rights guaranteed to them un
der the United States Constitution, the state will be held account
able. 90 This rule grows out of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution which secures all persons against any
state action which results in deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. 91 In Shelley v. Kraemer,92 the Court
defined state action as the exertion of state power in all forms. It
concluded, therefore, that judicial enforcement of private agree
ments excluding blacks from buying real estate constituted state ac
tion in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Judicial enforce
ment of private restaurants' policies of excluding blacks was also
found to constitute state action in Bell v. Maryland. 93
In NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson,94 the Court reversed
a judgment of civil contempt entered against the National Associa
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for refusing
to comply with a court order requiring the production of member
88. This theme runs throughout the majority opinion.
Of course, disclosure may also permit those who oppose abortions to focus
pressure on the named doctors to convince them that it would be in their
best interests to cease providing the service. The propriety of such action,
however, is not before this court, which is concerned ... only with the ef
fect of the disclosure itself.
274 N.W.2d at 92. "If antiabortion factions of the public convince him [the physi
cian] to stop performing abortions, his decision will be the result of private, not
state, actions .... [D}isclosure itself does not constitute 'interference' by the state."
[d. at 92-93.
89. Id. at 97 (Otis, J., dissenting).
90. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
93. 378 U.S. 226, 259 (1964).
94. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

586

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:569

ship list. The Court held that the lower court's production order
constituted state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment
because it provided the public with the means of denying citizens
their constitutional right of association. 95 In making its determina
tion, the Court looked to previous acts of public hostility that had
followed from revelation of the identity of NAACP members and
concluded that the compelled disclosure of its Alabama member
ship list might induce members to withdraw, or dissuade others
from joining. That such acts of hostility would follow from private
community pressures rather than from direct state measures did
not discourage the Court from a finding of state action. "The cru
cial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it
is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the
production order that private action takes hold. "96
The Minnesota court's determination that a doctor's decision
to stop performing abortions due to public pressure would not be
the result of state action97 is untenable in light of Shelley, Bell, and
NAACP. It is only after the initial exertion of state power repre
sented by disclosure that private action in the form of hostility to
wards abortion providers can take hold. Past experience indicates
that acts of public hostility are likely to follow upon disclosure, 98
and any resulting reduction in the number of Medicaid abortion
providers will seriously interfere with the patients' abortion deci
sions. The state cannot deny its role in this deprivation of constitu
tional rights.

B.

The Doctor-Patient Relation

A major consideration in the court's decision to allow disclo
sure was the public's interest in knowing about the workings of
government. The court held that the public's right of access to re
cords of official business outweighed the doctors' asserted rights
not to have all their professional and business dealings made pub
lic. 99 Crucial to the court's determination was its finding that dis
closure did not infringe on any fundamental privacy right of the
doctors.1oo Inevitably, when the public's important right of infor
mation is balanced against the doctors' limited privacy interests, the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 463.
274 N.W.2d at 92.
See note 72 supra.
274 N.W.2d at 93-94.
Id. at 94.
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argument against disclosure loses much of its force. This balanc
ing test, however, was flawed by the court's failure to consider the
effect of disclosure on the patients' fundamental right of privacy.
By excluding the patients from the analysis of the competing
interests at stake, the court was able to compare this case to pre
vious cases which allowed publication of state held information
when no fundamental rights were threatened by disclosure. The
Minnesota court primarily relied on two United States Supreme
Court decisions, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 101 and Paul v.
Davis .102 Major discrepancies between the facts in Cox and Paul
and the facts in Minnesota Medical,103 however, undermine their
value as authority for the Minnesota decision.
Cox held unconstitutional a Georgia law prohibiting the publi
cation of the names of rape victims on the ground that the informa
tion was contained in official court records open to public in spec
tion. 104 In Minnesota Medical, however, the publication of public
data was not the issue. The issue was whether the data in question
was public at all. Cox is not authority for the contention that all of
ficial records are public records. In fact, the Court was careful to
explain that its decision did not imply anything about the constitu
tional questions which might arise from a state policy of restricting
public access to various kinds of official records. 105 The Court was
not compelled, however, to distinguish between public and non
public official records because there was no contention in Cox that
the court records were not open to public inspection. lOS The
Minnesota court's reliance on Cox for the proposition that the pub
lic has a right to the records of medical payments because they are
records of official activities is, therefore, misplaced.
In Paul, the Court held that an individual whose arrest record
was distributed to merchants by the police department had no con
stitutional claim to an invasion of privacy. 107 The Court stated that
the personal rights found in the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of personal privacy are limited to those which are " 'fundamental'
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "108 Included in this
definition are matters relating to marriage, procreation, contracep
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

420 U.S. 46H (1975).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
274 N.W.2d at 84.
420 U.S. at 492.
Id. at 496 n.26.
Id. at 496.
424 U.S. at 713.
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In these
areas there are limitations on a state's power to regulate conduct
substantively. The Court held that an official act such as an arrest,
however, does not fall within the privacy sphere, and consequently
it is not subject to the same constitutional protection. 109
The Minnesota court determined that under Paul, disclosure
of the names of Medicaid abortion providers did not violate the
doctors' rights of privacy because all that was involved was disclo
sure of records of official acts. 110 The disclosure of arrest records in
Paul, however, did not involve an interference with a fundamental
right of the plaintiff. The decision in that case should not, there
fore, be dispositive of the issues in the present case. The patients'
interests affected by disclosure of doctors' names are precisely
within the area of matters of an intimate nature identified by the
Paul Court where there are limitations on a state's power to regu
late conduct substantively.111 Interference with the fundamental
rights of patients cannot be overlooked simply by posing the ques
tion in terms of doctors' rights. The interests of the doctors and
their patients must be viewed together due to the special relation
ship between the doctor and the patient in the abortion deci
sion. 112
109. The Court stated that respondent's claim was not based on any recognized
privacy claim, and that the Court would not enlarge the constitutional right of pri
vacy to include his claim that the state may not publicize records of official acts such
as an arrest. 424 U.S. at 713.
1l0. 274 N.W.2d at 94.
llI. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:
In Roe the Court pointed out that the personal rights found in this guarantee
of personal privacy must be limited to those which are "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" as described in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288, 292 (1937).
The activities detailed as being within this definition were ones very differ
ent from that for which respondent claims constitutional protection-matters
relating to marriage, 'procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held that there are
limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct.
424 U.S. at 713.
112. The Minnesota court itself recognized the unique nature of the doctor
patient relationship by granting the doctors standing to assert their patients' rights.
274 N.W.2d at 87 n.2. On the standing issue, the court relied on Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976), which held that it is generally appropriate for a physician
to assert the rights of women patients in an action against state interference with the
abortion decision. The basis for the Singleton exception, to the general rule prohib
iting resolution of controversies on the basis of the rights of third personS" not parties
to the litigation, was the Court's finding of an intimate relationship between the doc
tor and the abortion patient. Id. at 117. Implicit in the Minnesota court's decision to
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When a state intrudes on a fundamental right, it is limited by
the need to show a compelling state interest for its interference
and it must effectuate that interest through means narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake,113 The
competing state interest involved in Minnesota Medical is the in
terest in allowing the public access to information about the work
ings of government. 114 As Cox held, the public needs information
about the operation of the government in order to have an intelli
gent voice in governmental affairs,U5 It is essential that the public
have access to information on the number of state funded abortions
and the amount of government funds dedicated to such services,
Only with this information in hand can the public be effective in its
attempts to limit or expand such services through demonstrations,
allow the doctors standing to assert their patients' rights, then, is the recognition that
the doctors' and patients' interests are closely intertwined.
It is not only in the area of standing that the link between doctors and patients
has been identified. The importance of this relationship in the abortion decision is a
theme that can be found running throughout the abortion cases, beginning with Roe.
In that decision, the Court stated that during the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation were matters to be left to the judgment of the attending physi
cian in consultation with the patient. 410 U.S. at 163. In Bolton, the Court observed
the importance of allowing the attending physician the discretion necessary to make
the best medical judgment for the benefit of the pregnant woman. Id. at 192. In
Whalen, the Court construed Bolton to mean that obstacles in the path of a doctor,
which had a significant impact on a woman's freedom to make a constitutionally pro
tected decision, violated the Constitution. 429 U.S. at 605 n.33. In 1979, the Court
again emphasized the central role of the physician in the abortion decision in
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979). The suggestion in all of these cases is
that interferences with a physician's ability to perform abortions may violate the pa
tient's constitutional rights as well.
113. In Griswold, the Court cautioned that "a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro
tected freedoms." 381 U.S. at 485. In Roe, the Court restated: "Where certain 'funda
mental rights' are involved, ... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake:~ 410 U.S. at 155.
114. 274 N.W.2d at 93.
.
115. [Iln a society in which each individual has but limited time and re
sources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his govern
ment, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient
form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed
upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of gov
ernment, and official records and documents open to the public are the basic
data of governmental operations. Without the information provided by the
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government
generally.
420 U.S. at 491-92.
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lobbying, or requests to their representatives. This need for infor
mation, however, must be effectuated in a manner that is least
likely to affect the woman's privacy interest. This can be accom
plished without disclosing the names of the doctors. 116
The Minnesota court advanced no compelling reason for dis
closure of the doctors' names beyond the public's right to know
about the workings of government. 117 There are less intrusive
alternatives available through which the state could easily satisfy
the public's legitimate informational needs without diminishing the
patients' privacy rights. The state could furnish the names of all
doctors who receive government reimbursement under the Medic
aid program, but limit the description of the services to the general
categories of surgical, medical, or psychological. 118 The state could
also disclose the number of state funded abortions and the amount
spent on those services without disclosing the names of the provid
ers. Alternatively, the state could demand a showing of substantial
need by the person requesting the information and limit the au
thorized use of the data released. Any of these methods is prefera
ble to disclosure of the names of abortion providers, which not
only invades a fundamental right, but also serves no significant
state interest.
CONCLUSION

In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that the consti
tutional right of privacy includes a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy and that the state cannot interfere with that decision
without advancing a compelling state interest. 119 The Minnesota
Supreme Court has effectively emasculated that right by its deci
sion in Minnesota Medical. The court was presented with the pro
posed disclosure by the state welfare department of sensitive infor
mation which could have a devastating impact on the ability of
indigent women to secure state funded abortions to which they
116. It might be argued that disclosure would benefit those seeking to termi
nate their pregnancies by enabling them to locate abortion providers. It is not neces
sary or appropriate, however, for the state to disclose to the public these names. In
dividual physicians or agencies may, if they choose, advertise their abortion services.
For cases, providing first amendment protection to abortion advertising, see Raimer
v. Connick, No. 73-469 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1976), afI'd sub nom. Guste v. Weeks, 429
U.S. 1056 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The choice of whether to
publicize available services should remain with the physician rather than the state.
117. 274 N.W.2d at 93.
lIB. Id. at 95 (Otis, J., dissenting).
119. 410 U.S. at 115.
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were entitled under the Minnesota Medicaid program. The court
focused on the form of the interference rather than on its actual
effect.
On its face, disclosure appeared to be only the doctors' con
cern, and the anticipated hostilities stemming from disclosure
would be inflicted by private citizens rather than by the state. This
is where the court's analysis stopped. It found no direct state inter
ference with the patients' rights, and therefore, did not require the
state to show that it had a compelling interest in disclosure or that
disclosure of doctors' names was the least intrusive means of
effectuating the state's interest in giving the public access to infor
mation about government spending.
The court's analysis, however, completely disregards the sub
stance of the woman's right of privacy. The guarantee of personal
autonomy in the abortion decision assures that the woman will be
protected against state interference in this area of fundamental im
portance. None of the Supreme Court privacy cases have held that
the woman is protected only from direct interferences and not from
indirect interferences with her right of privacy. The Court's con
cern has been with the impact on the woman's decision rather than
with the form that any particular interference has taken. The
Minnesota decision, however, evidences a contrary concern for
form over substance. It opens the door to unlimited interference
by the state in an area which is constitutionally protected against
the state's intrusion.
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